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THE EFFECTS OF PRICE REGULTION ON PHARMACEUTICAL R&D AND INNOVATION
Heather M. O'Neill
Lena Clarissa Crain
Department of Business and Economics
Ursinus College
Collegeville, PA 19425

ABSTRACT
As nsrng health care expenditures focus

government
attention on slowing the growth, the pharmaceutical industry
comes under increasing pressure to curb prices of ethical
drugs. Pharmaceutical price regulations have been
implemented in many countries to control pharmaceutical
expenditures. Yet, creating innovative drugs requires
enormous R&D costs, which in turn require adequate
expected economic returns. Since price controls reduce
profits and expected returns, as countries invoke stricter price
regulations, firms will either move their R&D process into
less regulated markets or move out of innovative R&D. This
paper assesses the impact of drug price regulations in Japan
compared to market-priced drugs in the US on
pharmaceutical innovation.
INTRODUCTION

In the past few decades, hundreds of innovative new drugs
have entered the marketplace. They help: improve quality of
life; save millions of lives; increase labor productivity
leading to more robust economies; and, provide cheaper, less
invasive solutions to chronic diseases, such as heart disease.
The improvements to quality oflife and life expectancy have
been significant. Studying US life expectancy between 1970
and 1991 , Lichtenberg ( 1998) conservatively estimates a $15
billion increase in pharmaceutical R&D expenditures saves
1.6 million life-years per year, valued at $27 billion.
Lichtenberg also frnds pharmaceutical innovation decreases
costs in other areas within the healthcare industry. For
example, Lichtenberg ( 1996) estimates for every $1 increase
in spending on pharmaceuticals there is a subsequent
decrease of $3.65 in hospitalization costs, yielding a savings
of $2.65 . Additionally, by reducing the age of utilized drugs
from 15 to 5.5 years, pharmaceutical expenditures increase
$18, but yield a $ 129 savings in non-drug expenditures for a
net savings of $111 (Lichtenberg 2002).
The worldwide pharmaceutical industry, as we know it today,
is relatively young, having only become global in the last
twenty years. Yet over a century of work by chiefly national
pharmaceutical industries has enabled the industry to
blossom globally. The countries leading the pharmaceutical
industry into the global era laid the path to success through
their domestic policies prior to globalization. Their
intellectual property rights and domestic market
environments, often coupled with public research funding,

enabled innovative pharmaceutical firms to prosper. From
1820 to 1990 these originator countries of the today's global
industry created the overwhelming supply of new drug
technologies. Between 1820 and 1990, 80% of globally
marketed, innovative drugs for the world's seven leading
indications came from just five countries: France, Germany,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States
(Landau et al 1999). The five next most productive countries
(Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden)
represented 19% of globally launched products, leaving only
1% coming from the rest of the world (Landau et al 1999).
The quantity of new products introduced per country is just
one measure of innovation. Another is the dollar value of a
country's pharmaceutical exports, since this figure highlights
reaching out to a global market. While the countries noted
above excel in exporting innovative drugs, the Japanese did
not from 1820 to present. From 1820-1990, about 60 percent
of the drugs in the Japanese market were only marketed
domestically and the value of Japanese exports was relatively
low (Landau et al 1999). Despite some improvement in
exports, by 2000 Japanese drug exports still ranked eleventh
in the OECD with exports of $2.73 billion compared to
$13.13 billion for the US (JPMA 2003). Japanese drug
exports to date have brought relatively little value to the
global market, contrary to Japan's various world-class
industries.
Patent protection in the Japanese market has lagged
compared to that in other developed countries: Only
processes, not compounds, were protected until 1976.
Therefore Japanese firms could launch a product that was
still under patent protection in other countries so long as they
produced it through a different process. Thus, much of the
research conducted in Japan prior to 1975 centered on the
"adapting" of internationally developed products and not the
development of novel products (Reich 1990). Fearing a
disadvantage in innovative R&D, in 1987 the Japanese
government began to direct funds toward innovative R&D.
Much of this effort, however, was countered by the dramatic
cuts in the government's national drug reimbursement prices
(Reich, 1990). Prices were cut an average of 61.4% in the
1980's, dampening innovator's expected returns (Reich
1990).
Today, despite the fact that Japan is the second largest single
market, its pharmaceutical industry continues to lag behind
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the United States and Europe in terms of innovation. The
Japanese market remains centered on domestic products, and
the few successful Japanese R&D-based firms are
increasingly concentrated in international
markets.
Companies like Takeda, Daiichi, and Sankyo continue to set
up headquarters in many more innovation friendly markets,
as Japan maintains Jess innovator friendly policies.

and Neun 2000). The USA Today reported findings from an
AA.RP study indicating a 27.4% average price increase in the
leading 155 selling drugs from 1999-2003 relative to 10.4%
general inflation (Welch 2004).
To bring a drug to market today, it takes approximately ten to
fifteen years and $1.7 billion in R&D costs (Launders 2003),
as compared to $231 million in 1987 (DiMasi et al 1991 ).
Along with the significant financial outlay needed to create a
new product also come the high risk of failure. Most
compounds and biologics investigated for therapeutic use
never make it to market. Of every 5,000 possible medicines
investigated, five make it through to clinical trials and one
becomes a marketable product generating revenues
exceeding average R&D costs (PhRMA 2000). Finns engage
in new drug development, but they need sufficient economic
returns to continue the process.

In contrast, Europe led the world in drug exports through the
late 1980s and early 1990s, reflecting the market
environment in which the industry developed (Landau,
Achilladelis, and Scriabine 1999). A leading factor for this
European predominance was early patent protection,
encouraging R&D leading to innovation. The creation of
new drugs coupled with strong, historical distribution chains
enabled the European pharmaceutical firms to flourish.
The same link to patent protection and innovation holds true
for the US where it is even more apparent in the
biopharmaceutical arena. Currently, the US is benefiting
greatly in the biopbarmaceutical market because it bas long
been providing protection to both natural products (since
1947) and recombinant DNA (since 1985) (Achilladelis
1999). Biological research was initially conducted by private
firms , qot by the major publicly-held pharmaceutical
companies. With the assurance of patent protection investors
moved into the budding biologics industry, as other industries
struggled (Achilladelis 1999). As the biologics industry
began to move into pharmaceuticals in the 1980s, many
European countries did not allow the genetic research needed
to produce new biologic entities. Thus, both technological
and intellectual capital moved to the US where they were
able to pursue innovation (Scriabine 1999). Today the US
continues to dominate this growing field of research.
According to EFPIA (2004), the US represents 73 .9% of
biological R&D today, followed by Europe at 22 .7%.

Pharmaceutical price and/or profit regulations have been
implemented in all OECD countries, except the US, to
attempt to control pharmaceutical expenditures. In Germany,
increased price regulations were implemented in 1992
through the Health Sector Act. By restricting prices, profits
were diminished and companies saw much less incentive to
conduct R&D in Germany. From 1992-1999, 23,000 jobs
were eliminated in the German pharmaceutical industry, and
by 2001 Germany had slipped from the number one to the
number three position in European countries conducting
innovative R&D (Kermani and Bonacossa 2003). The UK
implemented profit restrictions, though they are not seen as
restrictive as the German scheme (Kermani and Bonacossa
2003). R&D activity has not been as gravely affected in the
UK compared to Germany.
Japan's government sets prices of new drugs based on older
comparator drugs. Recently, price premiums have been
permitted on truly innovative drugs, but even with the
premium in place the introductory price is not higher than
that of older drugs. Following a drug launch, the government
decreases the price as the product matures; the highest price
ever received is the first one. Prices fall by as much as two
thirds from the original price within ten years. The low
introductory prices, coupled with no inflationary price
increases, discourage new product development (Phrrna
2005).

The dominance of the US and Europe in creating innovative
drugs has continued since 1990, however, there has been a
movement toward more of the innovations coming from the
US . P.E. Barral (2004) focuses on new drugs authorized in at
least four of the major world markets and shows the four
European originator countries accounted for 61 new drugs
produced between 1975-1979, compared to 54 for the US. By
1990-1994, European firms were the originator of 38 new
drugs relative to the US's 40 (Barral 2004). Of the top ten
selling drugs in the world today, US firms developed eight of
them (Phrrna Profile 2002).

The United States is the least regulated market in the
industrialized world, and has seen R&D increase
significantly. EFPIA reports that in 1990, Europe led the
United States in R&D spending by more than 70%, whereas
today R&D in the United Stats is greater than that in Europe
(EFPIA 2002 in Kermani and Bonacossa, 2003). We contend
that as countries increase the stringency of the their price
regulations, companies will either move their R&D processes
into less regulated markets, or move out of innovative R&D.

Despite the growing evidence of the tremendous benefits of
innovative drugs, great attention is drawn to their costs by
consumers and governments; the pharmaceutical industry has
come under increasing pressure to curb prices of ethical
drugs. Between 1981-1994 drug prices rose an average of
9.6% annually compared to 5.1 % average inflation (Santerre
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In this paper we will provide insight into the factors leading
to innovative drug production in the US . We also examine
the impact of regulation on innovation in the world
pharmaceutical market by comparing the US and Japan.
Specifically, have the more restrictive drug regulations in
Japan altered the innovation playing field and led to less
innovation in Japan compared to the US?
INNOVATION
R&D in the pharmaceutical industry is the process by which
innovative firms discover, test, and receive approval for
ethical drugs. There are two main categories in which R&D
falls; innovative and imitative. Imitative R&D primarily
produces generics, me-too drugs, and line extensions.
Therefore, it is the cheaper and "safer" form of R&D, but
provides only incremental benefit to society. In contrast,
innovative R&D produces novel products such as New
Molecular Entities (NMEs) or New Chemical Entities
(NCEs), which are one in the same. They are defined as, "any
medication containing an active substance that has never
before been approved for marketing in any form ... Thus, new
dosage forms, strengths, or indications of already approved
drugs are not considered NMEs or NCEs." (CDER 2004).
While generics, me-too drugs, and line extensions play
important roles, innovative products represent the largest
benefits for society and absorb the greatest portion of R&D.
efforts and expenditures. Thus, current trends in various
stages in the novel R&D process can be used as metrics for
innovation.
How to measure the output associated with R&D inputs is a
subject of debate. Some use NME's or NCE's, suggesting
these are ultimately the end product. One can also argue
NCEs first in a therapeutic class is a better measure of output.
Similarly, how many people are impacted by the NCE is also
a viable measure. Traditionally, however, NMEs are used as
a broad measure ofR&D output.
In recent years, the productivity of R&D has become ·a
concern. In Figure 1, US R&D expenditures per year are
compared to number of NMEs entering the US market per
year. While total R&D has risen every year since 1980, the
number of NMEs launched per year has oscillated downw:nd
since 1996. For example, the number of NMEs in the US
declined from 35 in 1999 to 21 in 2003.
In a recent report requested of the European Commission,
Charles River Associates (CRA 2004) contends there is not a
global crisis in innovative R&D. By analyzing historical
swings in launches per year and tracking the movement
between the different phases of development until a New
Drug Application (NDA) is filed, CRA predicts
authorizations are likely to grow in 2005 (CRA 2004).
NDAs are submitted to the regulatory board of a country at
the end of Phase III in the R&D process. The regulatory

board reviews the application to ensure all safety and efficacy
requirements are met. If the drug is found to meet all
requirements it is given marketing approval (PhRMA 2001).
Therefore increases in submissions should generate an
increase in approvals. CRA (2004) believes the downturn in
launches due to fewer approvals was brought on by changes
in the market rather than decreases in innovation. They
suggest that by streamlining the regulatory process, providing
standardized exclusivity, and allowing for faster market
access, the number of drugs launched per year should
increase (CRA 2004) .
While CRA (2004) did not find there was a cns1s in
innovation, they did find there is a disproportionate amount
of new products, especially biologics, coming from the US
versus the EU and Japan. New biologic entities (NBEs) use
biotechnology to produce a new drug. The process is
described by Scriabine (1999) as, "genes that can generate
the potential products are discovered, cloned, and introduced
into bacteria, yeast, or mammalian cells capable of producing
the desired products in large quantities." As noted earlier, the
US gained an early advantage over the EU due to better the
patent protection and continues to attract relatively more
resources to the biopharmaceutical arena.
New Active Substances (NASs) include NMEs and NBEs
and serve as another metric for drug innovation. The origins
of the companies producing NASs first launched in the world
have shifted towards the US since 1980. According to Figure
2, NASs originating in US companies have increased from
5% between 1980-83 to 47% for 2000-03 (HHS 2004). Since
1994 the shift toward the US is dramatic. While this speaks
positively for the R&D output in the United States, it is also
noted that the total number of NASs produced per 4 year
period has been slowly decreasing since 1987, again raising
concerns about the productivity of the R&D dollars.
THE R&D PROCESS
In the R&D process, patents are sought even before a
possible drug has entered clinical trials. When a firm
determines a compound is likely to create a desired effect, the
researching company seeks patents for a range of indications
that the compound could possibly treat. It is essential that
firms patent any innovation directly upon discovery so as to
protect their investments in R&D on this compound, despite
the fact that this limits the patent life remaining on a product
at market launch. Once patents are granted, firms proceed
with the R&D process by checking for the safety, toxicity,
and metabolism of the compound through tests on animal
subjects. If a drug is determined to have no severe side
effects that could lead to complications in humans, the
sponsor submits an Investigational New Drug (IND)
application. If approved, the IND application gives sponsors
the ability to proceed with clinical trials.
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mandated by the regulatory board in order for a particular
drug to be approved temporarily with final approval subject
to the results of the additional trials. The industry believes the
new standards are often times unrealistic and even
unachievable (Ruffolo, 2003). Today, this practice has
become so wide spread that it accounts for 26 percent of
clinical R&D out-of-pocket spending (Ruffolo, 2003). In
2003, Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development
(CSDD) increased its R&D cost per drug estimate from $802
million, as stated in 200 1, to $897 million in 2003 to include
the cost of post-approval studies (Tufts 2003).

Clinical trials consist of three phases. Phase I is conducted on
healthy volunteers to determine safety and dosage. In phase
II, people with the given indication take the drug to test for
efficacy and side effects. At the end of this phase, the sponsor
meets with the regulatory board, the Food and Drug
Administration in the US, to show data and receive clearance
for end phase trials. Phase III trials use volunteers with the
condition to test for long-term side effects. Upon completion
of Phase III a sponsor compiles all their findings and submits
a New Drug Application (NDA) referred to as Phase IV. If
the drug is found to meet all regulatory board requirements it
is given marketing approval.

Not only do supplementary trials cost a great deal, they also
delay the market launch of drugs, which in turn hurts
patients. Japan is best known for its supplementary trial
demands. The country often refuses to accept trials conducted
outside its borders, arguing Japanese bodies are intrinsically
different from other races. While there may be some
biological differences, most firms believe that the demands of
the Japanese regulatory board are unreasonable. Thus, it is
likely that many international firms will stop seeking
regulatory approval in Japan (Ruffolo, 2003). Despite the fact
the innovative pharmaceutical industry lies primarily in only
three markets, the US, EU, and Japan, they lack harmonized
systems of approval. Thus companies are forced to do at least
three different types of clinical trials, effectively tripling
clinical expenditures.

The safety and efficacy standards firms must meet to receive
regulatory approval are high. The trend of growing efficacy
and safety burden-of-proof standards began following the
Thalidomide tragedy in the late 1950s. When Thalidomide
was found to cause birth defects, the public demanded more
care be taken in determining whether or not a product was
safe to market. The FDA increased regulatory stringencies to
ensure safety in 1962, but the greater safety measures
severely affected the launch of products within the US. The
number of new drugs introduced in the United States fell
70% that year. The new regulations also increased the
amount of time invested in R&D, thereby delaying
submission of NDAs and shortening nominal patent life.
Furthermore, fewer compounds made it through clinical trials
and into the market. All these factors led to the US lagging
behind France, Germany, and the UK in new drug
introductions by 1.0, 1.6, and 2. 1 years respectively
(Achilad:-:lis 1999). By 1970, US companies had begun to
launch up to 60% of their products in Europe prior to
launching in the US , thereby circumventing the burden of
FDA approval. In the mid-1980s, Europe began to implement
regulatory policies similar to those of the US, and thus US
company first launches in Europe declined to between 2025% (Achiladelis, 1999).

Japan's regulatory process is burdensome. Four consultations
with the Ministry of Health are required during the approval
process. Due to severe understaffing, the appointments are
made several months in advance. In the event a meeting
needs to be rescheduled because clinical trial data are not yet
available, a six month delay occurs. Moreover, since
Japanese doctors are not paid to undertake clinical trials,
because hospitals receive payment, it is increasingly difficult
to find consenting doctors. These actions further limit the
incentives to do R&D in Japan (O'Neill 2005).

In Europe, the effects of increased efficacy standards in the
mid-1980s were compounded by the fact that each country
had its own regulatory board. The FDA represents the United
States, and thus a major portion of the world pharmaceutical
market. However, in Europe, each country had its own board
and therefore its own efficacy standards. The creation of the
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medical Products
(EMEA) was an attempt by the European community to
harmonize its regulatory process and thereby allow
manufacturers to have better access to the market. While this
organization attempts to harmonize the European community,
many national and local regulatory boards still exist
throughout European countries (Kermani and Bonacossa,
2003).

With the increased number of clinical trials required, there
has been an increase in the cost of conducting clinical trials.
In the last ten years the cost of conducting clinical trials has
increased five-fold and the cost of preclinical development
has increased 60 percent (CRA 2004). As the complexity of
products grows, so do the complexity of trials needed to
prove safety and efficacy. R&D today is concentrated on
complicated, chronic diseases, in which it is harder to create
a successful drug. The industry has already developed
treatments and cures for most infectious diseases, and
therefore they are now burning science and money on harder
to treat indications (Ghosh 2003). The CRA (2004) finds
there is clear evidence that the cost of R&D varies across
therapeutic categories, therefore R&D costs are driven up as
the industry moves into working on more complicated
diseases.

Today, regulatory boards are now calling on companies to
conduct more studies than before and requiring post-market
commitments. Post-marketing commitments are clinical trials
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types of drugs being investigated, they can no longer be
competitive alone. Merging with another firm provides an
opportunity to gain more capital with which to investigate
new drugs, as well as more possible compounds to
investigate. For example, the company known today as
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) was originally 9 smaller frrms that
combined into three firms, and now into one. Bristol-Myers
Squibb was originally six other companies that combined to
become four companies, and today represent only one.
Wyeth is a combination of nineteen companies (Ruffolo,
2003). The mergers of GSK, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Pfizer,
Aventis, and Wyeth have occurred in only the past 20 years.
Originally representing 42 different firms , today there are
only five. Ruffolo estimates that it takes at least 8 significant
pharmaceutical firms to create one company that is
competitive in today's market. That is an 88% decrease in the
size of the pharmaceutical industry within the last 20 years
(Ruffolo 2003). He attributes this collapse to the increase in
R&D time and costs as well as declining success rates.

EFFECTS OF PRICE REGULATION ON R&D
One can think of R&D as a pay-as-you-go process. Years of
R&D expense are incurred prior to a drug' s launch, yet these
expenses are paid for with funds generated through current
sales, retained earnings or investor monies. Thus, current
funds pay for current research that may not come to fruition
in terms of a NDA for many years to come. After FDA
approval is given and the new drug is marketed, these
receipts can be used to support new research endeavors.
Whether or not the receipts over the coming years are great
enough to cover or "recoup" the already expensed R&D has
two implications. First, it is immaterial if the R&D costs are
recouped because the costs have already been paid. The
second, however, is more important. If receipts earned are
less than what it cost to create the drug, management of the
firm and the firm ' s investors will be displeased with losing
the gamble and question current R&D decisions. With
hindsight, the drug was a bad investment. In addition, there
will be less than anticipated revenues available to generate
newR&D.

Price regulation of a country' s pharmaceutical market not
only affects that country, but the world as a whole. This is
true because the revenues from one country directly affect the
revenues for multinational research-based pharmaceutical
companies. International price comparisons and parallel trade
are the primary sources of regulatory spillover; many
regulatory systems use price referencing as a benchmark for
reimbursement prices. Reference pricing occurs when a
country gathers price data from other countries to create
comparative price analyses, allowing payers to set a
reimbursement ceiling (O 'Neill, 2003). Generally, lower
prices from counties with highly price sensitive or highly
regulated markets are being used as a benchmark, creating
artificially low prices in the country using the reference
pricing. These artificially low prices, especially prevalent in
Japan, decrease the ability of pharmaceutical firms to earn
sufficient revenues to maintain existing R&D projects.

Introducing price regulations hinders R&D. Take the
hypothetical situation of a company. In year zero, the
company has entities A through Z that could possibly create
new drugs. Due to budgetary constraints and projected
internal rates of return only six entities are selected for
further exploration. Suppose in the fifth year of the R&D
process, the country in which this company is conducting
research implements unexpected price regulations, which
effectively cut possible returns in half As a result, two
products are dropped from the R&D process, as they will no
longer witness returns great enough to warrant further
investigation. At year ten, when the remaining four products
should have completed the R&D process, only three come to
market assuming one has failed to meet efficacy and safety
standards. Due to the decreased cash flow brought on by
fewer marketed drugs, the new budget constraint only allows
for three new entities to enter the R&D pipeline in year 10
instead of six as had been previously investigated in year
zero. Perhaps two will make it to the market. Thus the effects
of price controls are two-fold: an immediate decreases in
R&D as prospective drugs witness diminished returns and
long term declines as smaller returns facilitate less R&D.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

In an older study, Jensen (1987) analyzed the effects of US
safety and efficacy regulation stringency on pharmaceutical
R&D. Her findings supported other studies which found the
1962 Amendments to the FDA guidelines for both efficacy
and safety did have negative, significant effects on the
number of new drugs being developed. She found , "the
magnitude of this effect appears to be large: a one month
decrease in each of the two regulatory delay variables would
lead to an increase of approximately 15% in the number of
NCEs discovered per year, ceteris paribus" (Jensen, 1987).

However, pharmaceutical companies are likely to change
their R&D process in certain ways to accommodate
regulation, rather then allow R&D to dry up completely.
They may respond by increasing the creation of imitative
drugs, by moving their research and development processes
to less regulated markets, or they may merge with or acquire
other pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms .

Troyer and Krasnikov (2002) use 1970-2000 data for US
NCEs, New Drug Applications and New Drug Approvals to
show how changes in FDA policies affected the three
innovation measures. They find R&D expenditures and sales
are highly correlated, thus they use changes in sales rather

In fact, there have been a significant number of "mega
mergers" between companies. Firms are finding that under
the increased pressure of R&D costs and the transition in the
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than changes in R&D to predict changes in innovations. A
one percent increase in sales growth currently and lagged one
year accounts for a 2.65% in the growth of New Drug
Applications, compared to a 2.89% increase in New Drugs
Approved. The number approved was positively impacted in
1984 and 1992, following the FDA's extension in patent
protection and shortened review times, respectively.
Limiting sales growth via price regulation in the US would
reduce pharmaceutical innovation (Troyner and Krasnikov
2002).

and Japan from 1970-1992. They found Europe was initially
responsible for introducing the most NCEs, but the data from
1990 to 1992 led them to believe this trend would not
continue. They argue the decrease in European
competitiveness can be linked to increasing price pressures
being born by innovative firms. With sales and margins
declining, companies are unable to earn sufficient monies to
reinvest in R&D and therefore were forced to cut their
budgets (Maclnnes et al, 1993).

According to research conducted by Grabowski (1986) there
are three structural factors that determine research
expenditure: research productivity, product diversification,
and the level of internally generated funds . These results are
reiterated by Achilladelis and Antonakis (2001) showing
annual R&D expenditures for ten global firms for 1950-1989
are determined by past R&D and cash flow. Grabowski's
indicators predict a change in the hub of R&D as increased
regulation occurs in one region relative to another. As
European countries have increased their regulations on
pharmaceuticals, manufacturers no longer see a promising
future nor do they have sufficient retained earnings to
encourage R&D investment. As a result, the R&D that once
took place in these countries is predicted to decrease. The
evidence of the 1990's supports this contention. By 1999,
R&D investment within Europe was down 73% from 1990 .
while the R&D industry in the United States grew from a $1
billion industry in 1970 to a $32 billion industry by 2002
(Pharmaceutical Industry Profile, 2003).

Scherer (2001) finds the US pharmaceutical industry is best
represented as a virtuous rent-seeking industry. Using
industry data from 1962-1996, he finds firms use profits to
create additional R&D ventures, which in turn increase R&D
costs until all supra-normal profits dissipate. Therefore
attempts to reduce prices and profits will have deleterious
impacts on future R&D.
As part of the Medicare Prescription Drug Act of 2003 ,
Congress requested a study be undertaken, directed by the
Commerce Department, to examine the effects of
pharmaceutical price deregulation on R&D and innovation.
In December 2004, the presented report stated estimated
increases in revenues between $17 .6-$26.7 billion annually,
following price deregulation. The higher revenues are
expected to increase R&D by $5.3-$8 billion annually,
resulting in an average of 2.7-4.1 new drugs each year
(Congress 2003). Once again, price regulations are seen as a
detriment to innovation.
MODELS AND DATA

Pammolli et al (2000) did an extensive study of the EU
pharmaceutical industry to see if the European industry is
falling behind that of the US. They find the EU firms have a
comparative disadvantage in selling their innovative
products, citing the number of NCEs created by US versus
EU finns since 1990 is not much different, but the US sales
of such are twice as high. They contend market demand for
drugs grew demonstrably in the US, and that despite the
multinational nature of the companies, firms still tend to
concentrate sales in their home market. This advantaged the
US firms, and subsequently several EU firms did move some
R&D and sales efforts to the US. Since 2000, British
GlaxoSmithKline, Swiss Novartis, Dutch Organon and
German Schering AG have moved substantial parts of their
businesses to the US . Additionally, Pammolli et al contend
the US has witnessed more vertical consolidation of R&D
efforts by firms, which coupled with the numerous biotech
upstarts, have created an R&D advantage in the US over the
EU (Pammolli et al 2000). One can infer the market demand
comes from the relatively unregulated nature of the US
market compared to the attempt to pare prices in the EU.

We investigate econometrically two interrelated phenomena.
First, we posit R&D employees and domestic sales create
innovative drugs, though with a lag. Second, price
regulations hinder the number of new drugs coming to
market; countries with drug price regulations will witness
less innovative activity since the regulations reduce the
returns to inventiveness. While those claims are not
surprising, the difficulty in testing them lies in the
availability of data. Ideally, we would like the dependent
variable to be the number of first launches of innovative
drugs (no me-too drugs) in the world per year based on the
drug company's country of origin. For example, if fifteen
new drugs appeared on the world market in 2004, regardless
of where they first appeared, we would like to know how
many of the drugs emanated from US firms, British firms,
Japanese firms, etc. We predict the number of new drugs
emanating from a country is directly related to R&D
employment and domestic sales in the country.
Domestic sales are an independent variable for three reasons.
First, firms will seek to create and market drugs where the
expected return is greatest. Since industry data on net profits
are not available, the proxy of sales is used. Second, using
domestic sales, as opposed to total sales that include foreign

Maclnnes et al ( 1993) conducted an international study of
drug utilization in the international pharmaceutical industry.
They studied NCEs and NBEs launched in the US, Europe,
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sales, suggests home country sales serve as the drawing card
for innovation as suggested by Pammolli et al (2000). Third,
R&D expenditures are needed to develop a drug and for postmarketing clinical trials.
These pay-as-you-go R&D
expenditures require sufficient sales, and domestic sales can
provide the funding . Additionally, since R&D expenditures
are highly correlated with R&D employment, the other
independent variable, domestic sales serve as the proxy for
R&D expenditures as proffered by Troyer and Krasnikov
(2002).
R&D personnel are hired to create new drugs and get them
approved. Though there is approximately a fifteen year time
lag between pre-clinical research and new drug approval,
there is a flurry of R&D activity required at Stage III trials.
According to Phrma (2003), 35% of R&D researchers are
involved in the basic, pre-clinical processes. The remainder,
which account for 68% of the R&D expenditures, are
involved in the drugs ' approval stages. In fact, 23% of the
R&D staff are involved at Stage III, which occurs about two
years prior to approval. For these reasons we expect lagged
R&D employment to predict new approvals.
Unfortunately, we are not privy to the data for the dependent
variable. We use a suitable alternative measure of
innovativeness: NCEs approved per year in each country.
Our dependent variable is a reasonable alternative to our
desired one for two reasons: the majority of the drugs
introduced in a market originate from home country firms ;
and new drugs corning from foreign firms require some R&D
activity in the approval country in order to pass regulatory
muster. We use NCEs approved only, not biologics or
vaccines, for two reasons. First, we are wary of not having
corresponding R&D figures for the biotech firms. Second,
for comparison purposes, the data from Japan only include
NCEs.
The national trade associations of the major markets survey
member firms annually and publish R&D employment and
sales. In the US, Phrma has surveyed its members since
1968. The R&D figures represent 80% of the pharmaceutical
and biopharmaceutical industry' s R&D expendirilres in 2004
(Profile 2005), though it was a higher percentage prior to the
increase in biotech products. Unfortunately, R&D
employment and expenditure figures are not available for the
numerous small biotech firms that are not members of
Phrma, which is why we concentrate on NCEs only, since
they derive from pharmaceutical companies. JPMA conducts
R&D surveys of firms operating in Japan and data are
available from 1980. VFA is the German trade association
conducting surveys, but the data begin in 1990. British,
Swiss and French data are available for too few years, thus
are not included. Lastly, we need data to span as many years
as possible to incorporate trends.

Concentrating on the US market for 1980-2004, we expect
more NCEs approved in the US over time as R&D
employment in the US increases and as domestic sales rise.
We use a multiple regression model (1) to estimate this
relationship:
m

m

NCEt= BO + I Bt-j *RDEMPj +I Bt-j *DSALESj+
j=O
j=O
B3 *TIME +B4*FDA+ i::t

(1)

NCEt is the number of NCE' s approved in year tin the US.
RDEMPj represents R&D employment in the US
pharmaceutical industry and we allow for lags (j) in
employment to impact innovation. DSALESj is US domestic
sales, which also allows for lagging. The Prescription Drug
User Fee Act (PDUFA) passed in 1992 led to a demonstrable
increase in NCEs in 1996, thus FDA is a binary variable for
1996. TIME represents time intervals 1, 2 . .. and its inclusion
is addressed below.
R&D employment in the US generally increases each year as
shown in Figure 2. NCEs approved each year in the US
oscillate as shown in Figure 2, suggesting the time sensitive
nature of NCEs, R&D employment, and domestic sales may
lead to spurious results when estimating (1).
The second model we estimate uses NCEs approved each
year in the US and Japan with the corresponding R&D
employment for each country each year. We cannot include
the other price regulating countries at this time due to
insufficient data. We test whether Japan has fewer predicted
NCEs given the regulated nature of its market relative to the
US by including a binary variable JAPAN. We estimate
m

NCEit= BO + I Bt-j*RDEMPij + B2*TIME + B3TIME2+
j=O
B4*JAPAN+i::t
(2)
where NCEit represents NCEs in each country i per year t.
R&D employment in country I in period t is RDEMPit. To
capture the quadratic shape of the NCEs, TIME and TIME
. squared are used. Domestic sales are only available for
twelve years in Japan, thus we exclude them as an
independent variable.
We have a complete data set for RDEMP, DSALES and
NCEs for the US for 1980-2003 . The NCEs only include
innovative drug approvals, not me-too drugs. The RDEMP
captures Phrma membership R&D employees in the US ,
which includes R&D employees working for foreign-based
firms operating in the US and in Phrma' s membership.
JPMA reports two sets of NCEs each year, one entitled
' manufactured' the other 'imported'. The first is NCEs
approved to firms manufacturing in Japan and the second
represents drugs approved for import. We use the former
since they are most closely related to Japanese R&D
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employment in Japan. Japanese data are available from
1980-2002. Unfortunately our results are limited by small
sample sizes.
US MARKET RESULTS
Estimating the US equation (1) may lead to spurious results
given the time sensitive nature of the variables. Each time
series variable is tested for unit roots using Ender' s procedure
(Enders, 1995). The Augmented Dickey Fuller test suggests
NCEs, RDEMP and DSALES have unit roots. The same
holds for the natural logs of R&D employment and domestic
sales, LNRDEMP and LNDSALES, respectively. The first
differences are stationary as shown in Table I.
Various lag structures were estimated using one and two
period lags. The most robust results appear in (3). All pvalues are given in parentheses.

Regressing levels on levels from (1) is feasible if the
variables are cointegrated and leads to non-spurious results.
Equation (5)'s Tau to test for cointegration is -3.86, which is
significant at .0 1, implying non-spurious results. Using the
runs test to test for serial correlation from the residuals in (5)
enable us to reject serial correlation.
/\

NCE1 = 10.12 + 26.12*FDA + .00042 *RDEMP 1_2 +
(.0003)
(.0931)
2

-.00006*DSALES 1 ADJ-R =.536 1
(.2842)

(5)

The results suggest approximately 2,380 additional R&D
employees in year twill increase NCE's by one in year t+2.
An influx of R&D personnel into the US will reap innovative
rewards. Domestic sales do not statistically significantly
impact NCE's, contrary to Troyner and Krasnikov (2002).

/\

ANCE.i = -7.64 + 29 .94*FDA + 51.l *ALNRDEMP1_2 +
(.0009)
(.0855)
35.58*ALNDSALES 1
(.3572)
ADJ-R2=.39 A NCE mean = .136

US VS. JAPAN RESULTS
(3)

DW=2.117

The model captures 39% of the variation in the change in
NCEs from one year to the next. Equation (3) suggests a 1%
increase in the growth of R&D employment in year t
accelerates NCE creation by 51, which is enormous relative
to the annual mean change in NCEs of .136. R&D. efforts
take time and the payoff is great two years hence, which is
not surprising given the influx of R&D activity at Stage III.
The coefficient on FDA implies the PDUF A impact was an
acceleration of almost 30 NCEs in 1996, which is consistent
with the jump from 28 to 53 between 1995 and 1996. The
coefficient on ALNSALES is not statistically significant. In
alternative estimations, time, foreign sales and total sales
were included, but none were significant.
Replacing ARDEMP for ALNRDEMP yields equation (4):
/\

ANCE1 = -7.09 + 29.15*FDA + .000878 *ARDEMP 1_2 +
(.0010)
(.0767)
35.67*ALNDSALES 1·
2
(.3525) ADJ-R = .40 A NCE mean= .136

(4)
DW=2.l l6

The results are very similar. The estimation implies a 1000
person change in R&D employment in year t accelerates
NCEs by .878 two years later. This suggests a 1, 140 person
increase in R&D employment now accelerates the NCEs by
one, two years from now. Witnessing the incredible increase
from 51,588 to 77,459 R&D employees between 2000 and
2003 in the US suggests a rapid acceleration of NCEs
approved in the US in the near future.

The second set of regression results concern price
regulations. Until more data are available for the UK,
Germany, Switzerland and France, the only comparison is
between the US and Japan. Since total sales figures are
limited for Japan, and domestic sales figures are not included
as an independent variable.
Equation (6) presents the
estimated results from (2) using the Yule-Walker technique
for correcting for autocorrelation. The Tau of-6.29 for the
cointegration test for (6) suggests non-spurious results.
/\

NCI;= 11.23 + .6372*TIME + -.0449*TIME2 +
(.5061)
(.1623)
.0003*RDEMP 1_2 + -7.44*JAPAN
(.1051)
(.0741)
ADJ-R2=.439

DW= l.88

(6)

Time and time squared are included to account for the
quadratic nature of NCEs in both countries. The signs on
these coefficients are as expected, but not statistically
significant. The coefficient on R&D employment lagged two
years implies an additional 1,000 people will increase NCEs
by .3 two years later. Alternatively, 3,333 additional
personnel will create one more NCE, ceteris paribus. The
number ofNCEs being approved in Japan is 7.5 less than that
in the US , holding time trends and R&D employment
constant. The regulations in Japan lead to fewer innovations,
regardless ofR&D employment.
CONCLUSION
R&D employment is a key factor in determining drug
innovation. In the US , adding 2,380 R&D employees will
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Second, finding the most recent data will not only elongate
the sample size but will show the most recent trends. As
soon as new US and Japanese data are available, the
equations will be re-estimated. Third, capturing Japanese
domestic sales data may enhance the US versus Japanese
model. Fourth, trying to incorporate biologics and R&D
employment in biologics may be feasible if data can be
found. The shift to biologics, especially in the US, needs to
be examined. Lastly, · finding the more ideal dependent
variable may be possible, which would cast a new and
perhaps better light on drug innovation.

increase NCEs two years later by one on average. This
positive impact also holds across the US and Japan. The
regulations in Japan create an environment not conducive to
innovation; about 7.5 fewer NCEs on average are approved
in Japan compared to the US. If Japanese firms begin to shift
R&D into the US, there will be a double impact on the
reduction of NCEs approved in Japan. This bodes poorly for
the Japanese drug industry.
There are several avenues available for future research. First,
collecting additional data on EU countries would enable a
more robust study. We are attempting to collect these data.

TABLE I- First Differences for Equation 1
!::. VARIABLE t-(t-1)

TAU VALUE
-4.36****
-3.84****
-2.92*
-3.89****
-3.27**

t::.NCE
t::.RDEMP

t::.DSALES
t::.LNRDEMP
!::.LNDSALES

where **** , **, and * denote p-values of .01, .05 and . l , respectively.

Figure 1.

US R&D Expenditures and R&D Employment
vs. NCEs per Year
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Figure 2.

US 9-iare of New Active Substances First in World Market
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Data From "HHS Task Force on Prescription Drug Importation." United States Department of
Health and Human Services. http://www.hhs.gov/importtaskforce/Report 12-20.pdf
accessed 3115105.
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